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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At the outset of this action, Appellant/Defendant Safeguard Business Systems, Inc. 
(“Safeguard”) moved to compel Respondent T3 Enterprises, Inc. (“T3”) to arbitrate its claims 
against Safeguard. The district court granted Safeguard’s motion. T3 subsequently filed a 
demand for arbitration, leading to a 6-day arbitration in Boise, Idaho. The Arbitration Panel 
consisted of a retired Washington Court of Appeals Judge, a commercial litigation attorney from 
Phoenix, Arizona, and a commercial litigation attorney from Denver, Colorado, who specializes 
in franchise law. The Panel found in T3’s favor, awarding damages of $1,475,707.53.    
The District Court then confirmed the Panel’s award. Safeguard now brings this appeal, 
raising four primary arguments: (1) the Panel acted irrationally; (2) the Panel purposefully 
disregarded Texas law; (3) the Panel should not have considered two alleged privileged attorney-
client communications (out of 282 exhibits); and (4) the District Court erred by requiring that 
arbitration take place in Boise, Idaho. There is no basis for any of Safeguard’s arguments.   
First, the Panel did not act irrationally or exceed its power. The Panel articulated its 
findings in a 35 page reasoned decision, with factual findings that are consistent with the jury 
verdict in the companion case of Thurston Enterprises v. Safeguard. And Safeguard cannot show 
that the Panel was not, at all relevant times, interpreting the T3 Distributor Agreement. 
Second, assuming manifest disregard of the law is still a valid basis to contest an 
arbitration award, there is no showing that the Panel purposefully disregarded Texas law. Here, 
manifest disregard of the law would only apply if the Panel recited that Texas law does not 
recognize a category of damages and then purposefully disregarded that law. However, T3’s 
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damages, attorneys’ fees and expenses were all awarded pursuant to overwhelming Texas law. 
Thus, there is no error of law let alone manifest disregard. 
Third, Safeguard never objected to T3’s offer in the arbitration proceeding of the two 
documents that Safeguard now claims are privileged. Thus, Safeguard waived any privilege 
associated with those two documents. Additionally, the communications are not privileged 
because they are neither legal advice nor communications made for the purpose of the rendition 
of legal advice. Rather, they are business communications made in furtherance of Safeguard’s 
oppressive, fraudulent, willful, and wanton attempts to get out of its obligation to pay the 
commissions that it owed to T3. Fourth, the District Court did not error by requiring the 
arbitration hearing take place in Boise, Idaho as Idaho Code section 29-110 was applicable.  
Safeguard’s appeal should be recognized for what it is, a frivolous attempt to avoid 
payment of a valid arbitration award for almost 2 years. For the reasons set forth below, this 
Court should affirm the District Court’s confirmation of the arbitration award and award T3 its 
attorneys’ fees and costs.  
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 The Arbitration Panel set out the facts in detail in their Interim Award. See R. 8110-8129.  
Safeguard is engaged in the distribution of Safeguard brand products and services 
(“Safeguard Systems”) through a nationwide network of franchisees, who operate as its 
distributors. R. 8111. Safeguard administers customer billing and accounts receivable and pays 
commissions to distributors. Id. Safeguard distributors exclusively provide Safeguard Systems. 
In 2006, after working for another Safeguard distributor, Roger Thurston, for 11 years, 
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Dawn Teply decided to start her own distributorship. R. 8112. Teply purchased Thurston’s 
exclusive rights to commissions on Safeguard sales to almost 2,000 of Thurston’s customers. Id. 
Teply formed T3 and transferred the customers. Id. Pursuant to their agreement, T3 agreed to pay 
Thurston $598,118.32, in 120 monthly installments of $4,984.32 in return for T3’s “rights to 
solicit, and receive commissions on” more than 1,863 of Thurston’s customers. Id.  
Contemporaneously, T3 entered into a franchise agreement with Safeguard on July 28, 
2006 (“T3 Distributor Agreement” or “Agreement”). Id. T3 purchased Thurston’s accounts 
knowing that the T3 Distributor Agreement had contractual rights called “Account Protection”: 
You shall have the exclusive right to the commissions generated on sales of 
Safeguard Systems to any customer listed on Exhibit B. This exclusive right to 
commissions applies to Safeguard Systems sales to each such customer for so 
long as is specified on Exhibit B or until this Agreement is terminated; however 
your exclusive right to commissions on sales of Safeguard Systems to any 
customer shall expire if that customer has not purchased any Safeguard System 
within thirty-six (36) months after the invoice date of such customer’s last prior 
purchase of any Safeguard System. 
 
R. 8114.  
As the Panel found, this language was unambiguous. R. 8117. Safeguard agreed that, if 
T3 solicited an order with a customer for any Safeguard Systems, then T3 was entitled to the 
exclusive rights to all commissions generated from any and all sales of Safeguard Systems to that 
customer (the “Protected Customer”). Id. Consequently, if Safeguard distributors or Safeguard 
itself, solicit sales of Safeguard Systems to the Protected Customers of another Safeguard 
distributor, the commission is “rotated” (e.g. paid) to the distributor with the Account Protection 
Rights. R. 8118. Thus, the other distributors must refrain from making sales to Protected 
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Customers, or risk having the commissions “rotated”. Id. 
Evidence at the hearing established that Safeguard has implemented and utilizes its 
databases, including CMS software to track and to manage the activity of its distributors. Id. 
Safeguard was able to determine whether a customer was the Protected Customer of another 
distributor routinely within a day and in some circumstances within a few minutes. Id.  
In 2008, Safeguard started its Business Acquisitions and Mergers (“BAM”) Program 
wherein a holding company, Safeguard Acquisitions, was funded to acquire independent non- 
Safeguard distributor businesses in the small business forms, supplies and services product 
market. R. 8119. In 2013, as part of its BAM Program, Safeguard purchased DocuSource and 
Idaho Business Forms (“IBF”), two distributors in the Pacific Northwest. DocuSource and IBF 
were direct competitors of T3 in the same relevant geographic market in Idaho, and historically 
sold a full line of products (i.e., not Safeguard Systems) that competed directly with T3’s sales of 
Safeguard Systems. Id. As a result, T3 had a high volume of cross-over customers with 
DocuSource and IBF. R. 8120.  
Safeguard was well aware of this. See R. 8120. As part of the BAM pre-sale due 
diligence process, Safeguard learned that at least $1 million of IBF’s revenue over a 12 month 
period, and almost $3 million over the prior 36 month period, came from the Protected 
Customers of T3 and other Safeguard distributors. Id. Safeguard’s internal documents showed 
that where IBF had greater sales, Safeguard intended to force the Safeguard distributor to either 
sell or share the account. Id. The Panel found that Safeguard knew that the IBF and DocuSource 
acquisitions would interfere with and violate T3’s Account Protection Rights. Id. Nonetheless, 
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Safeguard proceeded with the transactions. R. 8121. 
After acquiring DocuSource and IBF, Safeguard positioned both of them as company-
owned distributors whom solicited orders on behalf of Safeguard and in competition with T3 and 
other Safeguard distributors. R. 8121. Safeguard encouraged, facilitated and allowed 
DocuSource and IBF sales agents to solicit and obtain orders for Safeguard’s sale of Safeguard 
Systems to T3’s Protected Customers. Id. At all times, Safeguard knew that it (through IBF and 
DocuSource’s sales agents) was selling to T3’s Protected Customers. R. 8127. Safeguard also 
provided IBF with lower prices than T3 thus allowing IBF to undercut T3’s prices. R. 8132.  
Because IBF and T3 shared the same Protected Customers, customer confusion ensued. 
R. 8122. Many of T3’s Protected Customers no longer knew from whom they were supposed to 
order and to whom they were supposed to pay. Id. This confusion was exacerbated when 
Safeguard sent a solicitation letter to many of T3’s Protected Customers directing them to use 
IBF for future sales. Id. Safeguard dispatched its general counsel, Michael Dunlap to deal with 
the predictable fallout from Safeguard’s decision to grant Account Protection rights for the same 
Protected Customers to two different distributors (T3 being one). Id.  Dunlap, like the rest of 
Safeguard, knew that T3 had enforceable Account Protection rights. Id. 
Safeguard’s reconciliation efforts, however, consisted of concealing the violations of 
T3’s Account Protection rights. R. 8122. Safeguard did not notify T3 that Safeguard, through 
IBF and DocuSource, was selling Safeguard Systems to T3’s Protected Customers. R. 8123. 
Safeguard did not rotate commissions as required under the Agreement. R. 8117. In response to 
Teply’s continued efforts to find out about the scope of the encroachment problem, Dunlap for 
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years continued to prevaricate by concealing information, misrepresenting what Safeguard knew 
and trying to get Teply to relinquish her accounts for pennies on the dollar. R. 8123.  
Throughout 2013 and into 2014, Safeguard employees continued to engage in a campaign 
of deception, misrepresenting to Teply that they did not have information about cross over 
accounts and giving Teply inaccurate partial lists of affected accounts. Id. At no point in time did 
Safeguard ever reveal to T3 the full list of Protected Customers Safeguard was selling to through, 
or by, IBF and DocuSource. R. 8127. Nor did Safeguard ever identify the sales that were being 
made to T3’s Protected Customers. Id.  
T3 called Robert Taylor as an expert witness to calculate its damages. R. 8129. With 
some minor adjustments, the Panel accepted Taylor’s calculations. Id. The Panel awarded the 
same categories of damages for each of T3’s claims: (1) $321,657.77 for past commissions (2) 
$373,473.76 for future commissions; (3) $214,432.39 for preferential pricing damages; and (4) 
$566,143.61 for the value of T3’s distributorship. Id. 
Rather than simply pay Teply her commissions, Safeguard engaged in a scorched earth 
litigation resulting in a 4 year case with an appellate record of nearly 20,000 pages, the very 
antithesis of what arbitration is supposed to be. See R. 8155-8176 (procedural history of the 
case). After considering Safeguard’s egregious conduct and the attorneys’ fees that resulted, the 
Panel awarded $2,449,208.14 in attorneys’ fees and $437,126.28 in expenses to T3. R. 8257-64.  
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether T3 is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs for the appeal under Tex. Civ. 
Prac. & Rem. Code § 38.001, Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code § 17.50 or Idaho Code § 12-121. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Courts, Idaho and federal alike, are reluctant to overturn an arbitration award because the 
purpose of arbitration is a faster, cheaper and conclusive alternative dispute resolution process. 
See R. 12740-43 (summarizing caselaw); Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 
341 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Hecla Min. Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 101 Idaho 557, 
617 P.2d 861 (1980). The standard of review for arbitration awards has been described as 
“among the narrowest known to the law.” ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 
1462 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 568 (2013) 
(courts may vacate an arbitrator’s decision “only in very unusual circumstances.”). 
“When reviewing a district court's decision to vacate or modify an award of an arbitration 
panel this Court employs virtually the same standard of review as that of the district court when 
ruling on the petition.” Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 814, 118 P.3d 141, 146 (2005). 
Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), a court must confirm an arbitration award unless 
there are statutory grounds to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitrator’s decision. 9 U.S.C. § 9.  
The FAA limits judicial review to those situations where the award was procured through fraud, 
the Panel acted impartially, the Panel exceeded their authority, the Panel failed to give a party a 
fair opportunity to present their case, or the Panel made an obvious mathematical or other 
clerical error. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a) and 11.   
Safeguard, in its appeal, only raises one of these issues on appeal, namely whether the 
Panel exceeded their authority. The remainder of Safeguard’s appeal addresses judicial standards 
of review that go beyond the limited grounds set forth in the FAA, i.e. manifest disregard of the 
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law and allegations that the Panel violated public policy or acted irrationally. Whether these are 
proper judicial standards of review under the FAA is called into question by recent decisions 
from the United States Supreme Court and the federal circuits. But even if these nonstatutory 
grounds do apply, there is no basis to claim that they apply in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SAFEGUARD DOES NOT PRESENT ANY GROUNDS FOR APPEAL UNDER THE FAA  
In 2008, the Supreme Court held that 9 U.S.C, §§ 10 and 11 "respectively provide the 
FAA's exclusive grounds for expedited vacatur and modification." Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. 
Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008). Safeguard’s appeal is largely based on the “manifest 
disregard,” “public policy” and “irrationality” non-statutory grounds for vacatur. In light of Hall 
Street, the First, Fifth and Eleventh circuits have held that these are no longer valid grounds for 
vacating an arbitration award. See Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Service, 524 F.3d 120, 124 
fn. 3 (1st Cir. 2008); Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 2009); 
Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2010).  
The Fifth Circuit considered the effect of Hall Street in Citigroup Global Markets. 562 
F.3d at 350. It first noted that “Hall Street clearly has the effect of further restricting the role of 
federal courts in the arbitration process”. Id. “Based both on the text [of the FAA] and on the 
legislative history, Hall Street concluded that §§ 10 and 11 provide the exclusive regimes for 
review under the FAA.” Id. at 353. The Fifth Circuit rejected the Second and Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of manifest disregard as being shorthand or gloss on Section 10(a)(4). Id. at 356-
358. “In the light of the Supreme Court's clear language that, under the FAA, the statutory 
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provisions are the exclusive grounds for vacatur, manifest disregard of the law as an 
independent, nonstatutory ground for setting aside an award must be abandoned and rejected.” 
Id. at 358. The First Circuit followed this reasoning in Frazier, wherein it held that the judicially 
created grounds for vacatur; arbitrary and capricious, in violation of public policy, and manifest 
disregard for the law, are no longer valid in light of Hall Street. Frazier, 604 F.3d at 1323-1324. 
As the language of Section 10 of FAA is plain and unambiguous there is no basis for 
construing additional grounds for vacatur. See State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 444, 362 P.3d 514, 
519 (2015) (“If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows 
the law as written.”) This Court should follow the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and Hall Street’s 
holding that the exclusive grounds for vacatur are set forth in Section 10 of the FAA. Thus, any 
arguments based on “manifest disregard,” “irrationality” or “public policy” should be denied.  
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's clear holding in Hall Street – that vacatur of an 
award is restricted to the statutory grounds set out in the FAA – some federal courts still apply 
very narrow non-statutory grounds for vacatur related to an arbitrator "exceeding his powers" 
under Section 10 above. The Ninth Circuit recognizes that "[a]rbitrators exceed their powers 
when they express a 'manifest disregard of law,' or when they issue an award that is 'completely 
irrational.'" Bosack v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1104 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 “Manifest disregard of the law requires that (1) the arbitrators knew of the governing 
legal principle and refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the governing law was well 
defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.” Moore, 141 Idaho at 819. In Hecla, this Court held that 
“manifest disregard” “is not an excuse for the court to weigh the ‘degree of error’ of law, if any, 
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and thereby thwart the rule of limited review.” 101 Idaho at 566. This standard has been 
interpreted as requiring the arbitrators themselves to “clearly identify the applicable, governing 
law” in their award “and then proceed to ignore it.” Hoffman v. Cargill Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 462 
(8th Cir. 2001). To the extent that this Court considers the manifest disregard standard, 
Safeguard should be required to show that the Panel stated (or at the very least recognized) the 
correct law in the award and then did not follow it. Safeguard cannot show any error of law let 
alone meet this standard.   
Similarly, the "completely irrational" standard, to the extent it’s still applicable, is 
"extremely narrow and is satisfied only 'where [the arbitration decision] fails to draw its essence 
from the agreement.'" Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1288 (9th Cir. 
2009). "To consider whether an award drew its essence from the … agreement, the court must 
ensure that the arbitrator looked to the words of the contract and to the conduct of the parties." 
Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 826, 831 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).  
As the parties “bargained for the arbitrator’s construction of their agreement,” an arbitral 
decision “even arguably construing or applying the contract” must stand, regardless of a court’s 
view of the merits. Oxford Health Plans, 569 U.S. at 569. The “sole question” for the court on 
motions to vacate under § 10(a)(4) is “whether the arbitrator (even arguably) interpreted the 
parties’ contract, not whether he got its meaning right or wrong.” Safeguard cannot show that the 
Panel disregarded the Agreement in any of its conclusions of law.  
As Safeguard cannot satisfy either the statutory or nonstatutory grounds for vacating an 
arbitration award under the FAA, its appeal lacks merit.  
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THE FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE 
UNENFORCEABLE AND IT IS NOT A GROUND FOR VACATING AN AWARD  
A. An Improper Forum Is Not a Ground for Vacating an Arbitration Award.  
Safeguard argues that the arbitration should have taken place in Dallas, Texas rather than 
Boise, Idaho and faults the District Court for not enforcing the forum selection clause in the T3 
Distributor Agreement. However, even if the District Court erred (it did not), such an error 
would not be grounds for vacating an arbitration award under the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).  
The sole grounds for vacatur are set forth under section 10 of the FAA. None of which 
regard forum selection. Safeguard provides no legal authority for its contention that section 5 of 
the FAA regards forum selection (by its language it does not) and even if it did, whether it would 
provide grounds for vacatur. Fundamentally, “an incorrect ruling of law that is not the basis for 
an award is insufficient” to vacate or modify an arbitration award. Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. 
Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2007). “[T]he fact that an arbitration was held in an 
improper venue does not call into question the merits of the [arbitration] award.” Id.; see also 
Richardson v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 12-CV-0485-WJM-KMT, 2014 WL 503203, at *2 (D. Colo. 
Feb. 7, 2014) (“The fact that an arbitration was held in the wrong venue is not sufficient 
to vacate an arbitration award.”) Thus, even if Safeguard’s arguments as to the enforcement of 
the forum selection clause had merit, it would not present a basis for vacatur.   
Safeguard cites to PoolRe Ins. Corp. v. Org. Strategies, Inc., 783 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2015) 
for the proposition that a failure to comply with the process set forth under Section 5 of the FAA 
is grounds for subsequently vacating an arbitration award. However, the PoolRe court applied 
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section 10(a)(4) in finding that an arbitrator exceeded his power and authority because he was 
appointed in a manner contrary to that provided in the agreement (and in fact by another 
agreement). Id. at 263. Here, however, the parties properly appointed the arbitrators. 
Safeguard argues that had the arbitration been in Dallas, the arbitration would have 
involved different arbitrators. However, there was no restriction in the arbitration provision 
requiring that the AAA arbitrators be domiciled in Texas. See R. 7717-7120. Thus, the same 
arbitrators could have been appointed had Dallas been the forum. Absent a specific provision to 
the contrary, the AAA could determine which potential arbitrators would hear the dispute. See 
e.g. Bulko v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., 450 F.3d 622, 626 (5th Cir. 2006) (reversing district 
court’s decision to vacate arbitration and holding that determining qualifications and eligibility 
of arbitrators was left to the arbitration provider absent a contrary contractual provision).  
Regardless of where the arbitration hearing took place, there is no question that the 
Arbitration Panel had the authority to rule on the dispute. The arbitration provision in the T3 
Distributor Agreement required that the arbitration “be conducted in accordance with the then 
current commercial arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association by a Panel of three 
(3) arbitrators.” R. 7118-7119. The Idaho arbitration was governed by the AAA Commercial 
Arbitration Rules and the Panel was composed of three AAA arbitrators. R. 7576, 8110, 13822-
29. The same AAA rules would have governed any arbitration in Texas and the qualifications for 
an AAA arbitrator are nationally uniform. Nor has Safeguard shown that only attorneys from 
inside Texas can construe Texas law. Thus, the selection of the arbitrators was not inconsistent 
with the T3 Distributor Agreement. The arbitrators had authority and did not exceed their power 
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in deciding the dispute. There is no basis for vacatur under section 10(a)(4). 
B. Even if the Forum was Incorrect, Any Error Was Harmless  
Under the string of authority Safeguard cites to, a “trivial departure” from the arbitrator 
selection method does not warrant vacatur. PoolRe, 783 F.3d at 263. Similarly, Safeguard must 
show that the choice of Idaho as the forum affected its substantial rights or prejudiced it. See 
I.R.C.P. Rule 61 (“At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and 
defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights”); Saleemi v. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., 176 
Wash. 2d 368, 387, 292 P.3d 108, 117 (2013) (a “party that fails to seek review of an order 
compelling arbitration on grounds of venue… until after the arbitrators award is known must 
show prejudice before an appellate court will reach the merits and grant relief”). 
Here, Safeguard has not shown that the choice of venue effected its hearing in any way. 
In support of the Motion to Vacate, Safeguard’s attorney submitted a declaration. R. 7698-7700. 
Conspicuously absent from that declaration is any mention that the location of the arbitration 
impeded discovery or the presentation of evidence. Id. The selection of Idaho as the forum did 
not prevent Safeguard from calling any of its witnesses at arbitration and thus it had no effect on 
the outcome. Consequently, it had no effect on any substantial right of Safeguard.  
The Washington Supreme Court considered the same argument in Saleemi v. Doctor’s 
Associates, Inc., 292 P.3d 108 (Wa. 2013). There, the Washington Supreme Court, en banc, 
reviewed a case wherein the franchisees had sued the franchisor for violation of franchise 
agreements. Id. at 371. The superior court found that the Connecticut forum selection clause was 
unconscionable and compelled arbitration in Washington. Id. at 373-374. After the franchisees 
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prevailed at arbitration, the franchisor appealed, arguing that because the arbitration was held in 
Washington instead of Connecticut, the award should be vacated. The Washington Supreme 
Court rejected the argument noting the following:  
Even assuming for the moment that the court erred in failing to change venue of 
the arbitration from Washington to Connecticut, no harm is apparent. The 
arbitration in Washington was conducted by the same arbitration group and under 
the same rules as required by the franchise agreements. DAI is a Florida 
corporation, the parties, the sandwich shops, and the witnesses all appear to be in 
Washington. DAI fails to show any harm or prejudice in the venue selection. 
 
Id. at 384. The same result applies here. As Safeguard cannot show any harm or prejudice or that 
its rights were effected in any way, an improper forum is not grounds for vacatur.  
C. Safeguard Waived the Right to Appeal the Forum Selection Clause Ruling 
Safeguard also waived its right to challenge any error as to the forum selected. Parties are 
“required, to raise their complaints about the arbitration during the arbitration process itself”. 
Marino v. Writer’s Guild of America, East, Inc., 992 F.2d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993). 1 At the 
very least, “objections to the composition of arbitration Panels must be raised at the time of the 
hearing.” Brook v. Peak Intern, Ltd., 294 F.3d 668, 674 (5th Cir. 2002). The failure to object at 
the hearing constitutes a waiver. Id. 
Safeguard did not object to the composition of the Arbitration Panel at any time. Indeed, 
at the arbitration hearing, Safeguard stipulated that it accepted the Panel’s composition. R. 8111 
                                                 
1 See also American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules, R7, 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf (“A party must object to the 
jurisdiction of the arbitrator or to the arbitrability of a claim or counterclaim no later than the 
filing of the answering statement to the claim or counterclaim that gives rise to the objection.”) 
(last accessed April 27, 2018).  
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at p. 2:1-2 (“At the commencement of the evidentiary hearing, the parties, through Ms. Teply 
and Mr. Dunlap affirmed that they accepted the Panel’s composition.”). Consequently, Safeguard 
waived the right to challenge the forum selected.  
Safeguard also waived the right to challenge enforcement of the purported delegation 
provision in the Agreement. Safeguard did not previously argue that the Arbitration Panel should 
determine the enforceability of the forum selection clause. Instead, Safeguard argued the 
opposite in its Motion to Compel Arbitration (and Reply), stating that “[t]he court must simply 
ensure that the arbitration agreement was validly entered into by the parties…” R. 759; see also 
R. 766. This constitutes a waiver. See Kirkman v. Stoker, 134 Idaho 541, 544, 6 P.3d 397, 400 
(2000) (“This Court does not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.”)2  
D. The District Court Had Jurisdiction to Consider the Clause’s Enforceability  
Setting aside that even an error would not be grounds for vacatur, the District Court did 
not err in deciding whether the forum selection clause was enforceable. Questions of arbitrability 
are typically reserved for the court. See AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 
U.S. 643, 649 (1986). The one exception is where a contract has a delegation provision. Id. 
However, “[c]ourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there 
is clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so.” First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 
514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); see also AT & T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. at 649. The “clear and 
                                                 
2 See also In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, 754 F.3d 1290, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 
2014) (holding that defendant waited too long to invoke delegation clause where it asked district 
court to decide threshold question of arbitrability and did not mention delegation clause); Bodine 
v. Cook's Pest Control Inc., 830 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 2016). 
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unmistakable” test reflects a “heightened standard of proof” that reverses the typical presumption 
in favor of the arbitration of disputes. See First Options of Chi., 514 U.S. at 945.  
Here, there was no clear and unmistakable delegation giving the arbitrators the power to 
decide questions of arbitrability in the T3 Distributor Agreement. The T3 Distributor Agreement 
contains contradictory provisions in Section 21(B) and Section 21(C). R. 7718-20. While Section 
21(B) states that “the validity of this agreement” would be decided by the Arbitration Panel, 
Section 21(C) states that any dispute “relating to the interpretation of this agreement or… the 
parties’ respective rights and obligations under this agreement” are reserved for a “court of 
competent jurisdiction by a judge sitting without a jury.” Id. In light of these contradictory 
provisions, the Court was well within its jurisdiction to determine arbitrability. See e.g. Ajamian 
v. CantorCO2e, L.P., 203 Cal. App. 4th 771, 792 (2012) (“where one contractual provision 
indicates that the enforceability of an arbitration provision is to be decided by the arbitrator, but 
another provision indicates that the court might also find provisions in the contract 
unenforceable, there is no clear and unmistakable delegation of authority to the arbitrator.”)3 
Further, assuming arguendo that there was a clear and unmistakable delegation, “a 
gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a 
question of arbitrability for a court to decide.” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 84 
(2002). The District Court had jurisdiction as T3 challenged the entire arbitration clause, 
                                                 
3 Rent–A–Center, W., Inc., v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 66 (2010), is factually distinguishable 
because the arbitration provision there explicitly stated that “[t]he Arbitrator, and not any federal, 
state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to 
the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this Agreement including, but not 
limited to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable.”  
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including the delegation provision, as being unenforceable in light of Idaho’s public policy 
against forum selection clauses. R. 963. See e.g. MacDonald v. CashCall, Inc, 883 F.3d 220 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (“Because the Loan Agreement’s forum selection clause is an integral, non-severable 
part of the arbitration agreement and because the CRST arbitral forum designated in that clause 
is illusory, the entire arbitration agreement, including the delegation clause, is unenforceable.”). 
Nor has Safeguard shown that the Arbitration Panel would have enforced the forum 
selection clause any differently than the District Court. “The arbitrators would presumably 
enforce the venue-selection clause in precisely the same way that a court would.” McCullagh v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 177 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, any error is harmless. 
E. The Forum Selection Clause Was Unenforceable 
The District Court did not err in finding that the forum selection clause was 
unenforceable under Texas law. Idaho has a strong public policy against the enforcement of out-
of-state forum-selection clauses, as codified at Idaho Code § 29-110. That statute provides that: 
Every stipulation or condition in a contract, by which any party thereto is 
restricted from enforcing his rights under the contract in Idaho tribunals, 
or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights, is 
void as it is against the public policy of Idaho. Nothing in this section shall 
affect contract provisions relating to arbitration so long as the contract 
does not require arbitration to be conducted outside the state of Idaho.  
 
Idaho Code § 29-110(1) (emphasis added).  
This Court dealt with a forum selection clause like the one in the T3 Distributor 
Agreement in Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Energywave Corp., 116 Idaho 56, 773 P.2d 1143 (1989). In 
Cerami-Kote, this Court noted that the Florida Supreme Court had expressly adopted the view 
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regarding the enforceability of forum selection clauses and public policy enunciated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. Id. at 1146. The Bremen sets forth that 
“[a] contractual choice-of-forum clause should be held unenforceable if enforcement would 
contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by 
statute or by judicial decision.” The Bremen, 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). This Court held that the 
enforcement of the forum selection clause would violate Idaho's public policy as expressed in 
I.C. § 29-110(1) and thus Florida courts would refuse to enforce the clause under The Bremen. 
Cerami-Kote, 773 P.2d at 1147. Federal Courts in Idaho have similarly held that other states’ 
courts would refuse to enforce a forum selection clause because of Idaho’s public policy.4  
Safeguard argues that this Court should reverse its holding in Cerami-Kote. However, 
The Bremen explicitly and clearly requires considering the public policy of “the forum in which 
suit is brought”. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15. Courts consistently interpret “the forum in which 
suit is brought” to be where the plaintiffs filed their case. T3 filed its case in Idaho. Therefore, 
application of The Bremen factors requires looking at the public policy of Idaho. See e.g. Brandt 
v. Comtrust, Inc., No. CV06-166-S-EJL, 2006 WL 2136145, at *2 (D. Idaho July 28, 2006) (“the 
suit has been filed in Idaho, so Idaho public policy should apply to determine if the enforcement 
of the clause would be unreasonable”). 
                                                 
4 Matunas v. Practiceworks Sys., LLC, No. CV-06-484-S-BLW, 2007 WL 1729738, at *3 (D. 
Idaho June 13, 2007) (holding that Georgia would not enforce the forum selection clause because 
of Idaho’s strong public policy against enforcing forum-selection clauses); IDACORP, Inc. v. 
Am. Fiber Sys., Inc., No. 1:11-CV-00654-EJL, 2012 WL 4139925, at *2 (D. Idaho Sept. 19, 
2012) (finding forum selection clause unenforceable under either New York or Federal Law 
because of Idaho’s strong public policy against enforcing forum-selection clauses). 
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Texas courts would refuse to enforce the forum selection clause in light of Idaho’s public 
policy. Texas currently follows the direction of The Bremen and recognizes that a forum 
selection clause is unenforceable when the clause contravenes the public policy of the forum 
where the suit was brought (in this case, Idaho). In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. 
2004) (“a clause would come within these exceptions if enforcement would contravene a strong 
public policy of the forum in which suit was brought, or when the contractually selected forum 
would be seriously inconvenient for trial.”).5 Nor does the FAA change the analysis. Arbitration 
agreements are “as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.” Opals on Ice Lingerie v. 
Body Lines, Inc., 320 F.3d 362, 369 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original). Because the tenet that 
a contract may be invalidated on grounds that it violates public policy is a principle of state 
contract law that “arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability 
of contracts generally,” see Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492–493 fn. 9 (1987), any 
conclusion that the forum selection clause is unenforceable is not preempted by the FAA. See 
e.g. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 990-993 (9th Cir. 2007).  
As Idaho Code section 29-110(1) evidences Idaho's strong public policy against forum 
selection clauses designating forums outside Idaho boundaries, the District Court did not err in 
finding the forum selection clause in the T3 Distributor Agreement to be unenforceable.  
                                                 
5 See also In re Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc., 257 S.W.3d 228, 231-32 (Tex. 2008) ("A trial court abuses 
its discretion in refusing to enforce a forum-selection clause unless the party opposing 
enforcement of the clause can clearly show that ... (3) enforcement would contravene a strong 
public policy of the forum where the suit was brought.]"); In re Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am., 494 
S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex. 2016) (same). 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN OVERRULING 
SAFEGUARD’S ASSERTION OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND IT IS NOT A 
GROUND FOR VACATING AN ARBITRATION AWARD  
In response to Safeguard concealing documents in discovery through the improper use of 
the attorney-client privilege designation, T3 and Thurston filed a motion to compel the 
production of the withheld documents. After the motion was filed, Safeguard and parent 
company Deluxe withdrew their claim of privilege as to hundreds of documents. R. 1863-1871, 
13129-13269. They maintained a privilege as to only 41 documents. R. 2219 at fn. 2. After an in-
camera review, the District Court held that 35 of those 41 documents had to be produced. R. 
2226-27. At issue are two of those documents which were used in the arbitration hearing.  
Safeguard argues that 21 exhibits fall under the attorney-client privilege, shouldn’t have 
been produced and that they prejudiced Safeguard in the arbitration hearing. However, only 
seven of the exhibits Safeguard discusses were subject to the District Court’s order.6 Safeguard 
voluntarily produced the other 14 exhibits and therefore those exhibits cannot be subject to this 
appeal. Further, the District Court’s ruling is only relevant to the extent a document was used in 
the arbitration hearing and thus could play a role in the Panel’s award. Of those 7 documents that 
were ordered produced, the only two documents that Safeguard challenged as being used in the 
arbitration hearing are T3’s Arbitration Exhibits 58 (Thurston Ex. 157) and 169 (Thurston Ex. 
327). See Appellant’s Brief, p. 25. 
                                                 
6 Thurston Trial Exhibits 157, 245, 267, 327, 336, 352, 356 were produced pursuant to the 
District Court’s Order. This can be verified by comparing the bates numbers on the exhibits as 
compared to the bates numbers identified in the District Court’s Order. R. 2226-27. Thurston 
Trial Exhibits 266, 268-270, 326, 328-330, 338, 357-360 and 362 were not subject to the Order. 
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A. The Use of Attorney-Client Privileged Documents Is Not a Basis for Vacatur 
Safeguard has not provided any legal basis for why even if the District Court incorrectly 
ruled that the two documents in question were not privileged, that it would justify vacating an 
arbitration award under the FAA. Discovery issues are not grounds for vacating an arbitration 
award. See e.g. Bain Cotton Co. v. Chesnutt Cotton Co., 531 Fed.Appx. 500, 501 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(“Regardless whether the district court or this court—or both—might disagree with the 
arbitrators' handling of Bain's discovery requests, that handling does not rise to the level required 
for vacating under any of the FAA's narrow and exclusive grounds.”); Osco Motors Co., LLC v. 
Quality Mark, Inc., No. CIV. 14-887 MJD/JJK, 2014 WL 4163595, at *7 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 
2014) (“the Court must afford the arbitrator great deference on matters not contemplated by § 10 
of the FAA” including any ruling “characterized as a discovery decision”). 
Further, Safeguard is not only asking the Court to reconsider a discovery decision, which 
is not grounds for vacatur, but also asking the Court to consider how the use of the purported 
privileged documents affected the arbitration award. Determining whether exhibits used in 
arbitration affected the award requires examining and weighing the facts that were before the 
Arbitration Panel. There is no basis for such a review under Section 10 of the FAA, even under 
the Ninth Circuit’s standards. See Coutee v. Barrington Capital Grp., LP, 336 F.3d 1128, 1134 
(9th Cir. 2003)  (under the FAA, courts have “no authority to re-weigh the evidence”.)  
B. Safeguard Waived the Right to Appeal the Award on Privilege Grounds 
Safeguard waived the privilege issue by (1) not objecting to the two purportedly 
privileged exhibits being admitted as evidence; (2) instead, stipulating to their admission; and (3) 
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not moving to vacate the arbitration award on the basis that the exhibits should have been 
excluded. R. 8111 at p. 2:7-9 (stipulating). Consequently, under both Idaho law and AAA rules, 
Safeguard waived its right to challenge any award on the basis that the evidence should have 
been excluded. See Am. Semiconductor., Inc. v. Sage Silicon Sols., LLC, 162 Idaho 119, 395 P.3d 
338, 350 (2017) (holding that a party cannot raise an issue on appeal where it did not object to 
the lower court); Marino, 992 F.2d at 1484 (parties are “required, to raise their complaints about 
the arbitration during the arbitration process itself”); AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, R-
34(c) (“The arbitrator shall take into account applicable principles of legal privilege, such as 
those involving the confidentiality of communications between a lawyer and client.”); R-41, 
(“Any party who proceeds with the arbitration … and who fails to state an objection in writing 
shall be deemed to have waived the right to object.”) 
Safeguard also waived any claim of privilege as to Safeguard’s General Counsel Michael 
Dunlap’s communications based on its discovery productions. Under Idaho law, a privilege is 
waived when the holder of the privilege “voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any 
significant part of the matter or communication.” I.R.E. 510. “[C]ourts typically apply such a 
waiver to all communications on the same subject matter.” PaineWebber Grp., Inc. v. Zinsmeyer 
Trusts P'ship, 187 F.3d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 1999). Safeguard withdrew the privilege claim as to 
hundreds of emails to and from Dunlap, amounting to about 90% of the documents that 
Safeguard has erroneously marked privileged. R 1863-1871, 13129-13269. Indeed, of the 21 
exhibits Safeguard contends fall under the attorney-client privilege, Safeguard voluntarily 
produced 14 of them. By producing Dunlap’s communications with Safeguard employees as to 
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the same topics, Safeguard waived any privilege as to Dunlap’s other communications.  
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Ordering Production 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) permits broad discovery over any relevant matter 
that is not privileged. “The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether or not to grant 
a motion to compel.” Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 351, 256 P.3d 755, 759 (2011). A 
decision “will only be reversed where there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” Quigley v. 
Kemp, 162 Idaho 408, 410, 398 P.3d 141, 143 (2017). 
Idaho Rules of Evidence 502(b) describes the attorney-client privilege as “a privilege to 
refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing [1] confidential 
communications [2] made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal 
services to the client. I.R.E. 502(b) (emphasis added). The party asserting a privilege, Safeguard, 
bears the burden of showing information is privileged. Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 
704, 116 P.3d 27, 34 (2005). With regard to in-house counsel, their communications are 
generally not presumed to be made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. Dewitt v. Walgreen 
Co., 2012 WL 3837764, at *3 (D. Idaho Sept. 4, 2012), citing United States v. Chevron Texaco 
Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2002). This presumption does not vitiate the 
attorney-client privilege. Instead, it aligns with the attorney-client privilege in general, as the 
“privilege impedes the truth-finding process and must be strictly construed”. Id. at *2.   
The two exhibits at issue do not implicate the attorney-client privilege as defined in 
I.R.E. 502(b). Exhibit 58 is an email string that begins with communications between Michael 
Dunlap and third parties Tressa McLaughlin and Jamie McCormick. See Thurston Trial Ex. 157. 
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The email represents an attempt by the parties to set up a meeting to discuss the fact that IBF and 
T3 are selling to the same customers. When the parties are unable to agree on a meeting time, a 
frustrated Dunlap forwards the string to then Safeguard employee Amy Tiller-Shumway. There 
is no legal research, analysis or advice given or solicited in the communications between Dunlap 
and Tiller-Shumway. Dunlap tells Tiller-Shumway that she can “tell Distributor Accounting that 
if there is a conflict with legacy distributors, the rule applies and it rotates to the legacy 
distributor”. This repeats the business policy in place at Safeguard Distributor Accounting of 
rotating commissions to the party who first made a sale to that account. Dunlap is not analyzing 
what the policy should be or any legal considerations. Compare Kirk, 141 Idaho at 704 (the 
“Suspension Orders contained legal advice and recommendations related to pending litigation.”) 
Safeguard argues broadly that because Dunlap was a lawyer, these communications were 
done in the overall context of providing a legal service. However, “[t]he mere fact that an 
attorney was involved in a communication does not automatically render the communication 
subject to the attorney-client privilege,” In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1172, 1182 
(10th Cir. 2010). “[R]ather, the communication must also relate to legal advice or strategy.” Id.7 
Where a lawyer tenders advice regarding a business decision, “the non-legal aspects of the 
decision are not protected simply because legal considerations also are involved.” Adams v. 
United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53533, *3-4 (D. Idaho July 3, 2008); Cedillo v. Farmers 
                                                 
7 See also United States v. Halifax Hospital Medical Center, No. 6:09–cv–1002–Orl–31TBS, 
2012 WL 5415108 *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2012) (“The content of the message must request legal 
assistance, and the information conveyed must be reasonably related to the assistance sought.”); 
United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The privilege applies only when 
legal advice is sought ‘from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such.’”) 
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Ins. Co., 163 Idaho 131, 408 P.3d 886, 896 (2017) (Burdick, C.J., dissenting) (“quasi-fiduciary 
tasks of investigating and evaluating or processing the claim” were not privileged, only counsel’s 
evaluation as to potential liability).8 “Corporations may not conduct their business affairs in 
private simply by staffing a transaction with attorneys.” Chevron, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1076. 
In Re Human Tissue Products Liability Litigation, 255 F.R.D. 151, 161 (D. N.J. 2008) is 
illustrative. There, the court found that documents relating to the lawyers’ tasks on that 
assignment pertained to business matters, rather than legal services because: (1) “none of the 
documents appear to contain any legal research or analysis”; and (2) the work could have as 
easily been performed by non-lawyers. The same can be said for Dunlap’s role here.  
The District Court was very familiar with Michael Dunlap’s role from the parties’ 
voluminous briefing throughout the case. R. 2226. In this context, the District Court made the 
factual finding that Dunlap “was extensively involved in the business aspects of [Safeguard], 
including monitoring cross-over customer sales and commissions and corresponding with [Teply 
and Thurston] regarding the extent of [Teply and Thurston’s] cross-over customers.” R. 2226. 
Similarly, Dunlap testified that he was not acting in a legal role when he was communicating in 
this capacity. R. 8123 at ¶ 35. As Dunlap’s concern has to do with his negotiations9 with the 
                                                 
8 Chevron Texaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1076 (“Corporations may not conduct their business 
affairs in private simply by staffing a transaction with attorneys.”); see also Oasis Int'l Waters, 
Inc. v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 87, 98 (2013) (privilege “does not apply when an attorney acts 
as a client's business or economic advisor”). 
9 Boss Mfg. Co. v. Hugo Boss AG, No. 97 CIV. 8495, 1999 WL 47324 SHS MHD (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 1, 1999) is distinguishable. It involved Hugo Boss’s attorneys attempting to settle ongoing 
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parties as to who would service which customers, rather than any legal issues, the message has 
no privilege ramifications. 
The other exhibit simply represents facts being communicated. Exhibit 169 contains an 
email from a third party, McLaughlin, to Dunlap wherein she identifies the amount of sales to 
certain cross-over customers. Thurston Trial Ex. 327. Dunlap then forwards the email to Sorrenti 
and notes that there is a possibility that Teply may request all commissions paid to IBF on her 
cross-over customers just like another distributor, the Strongs are claiming. In so doing, Dunlap 
is simply commenting on a possible outcome based on his conversations with Teply. Dunlap 
does not provide any legal analysis as to whether Safeguard would be liable if T3 took such a 
position. Indeed, both of these communications could easily have been made by non-lawyers.  
Communications consisting of purely factual information, without any legal advice, or 
not for the purpose of facilitating legal services, are not privileged. See In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 616 F.3d at 1182 (“when an attorney conveys to his client facts acquired from other 
persons or sources, those facts are not privileged.”); Dewitt, 2012 WL 3837764 at *3. Dunlap’s 
communications with regard to Teply or McLaughlin’s inquiries regarding cross-over customer 
sales and commissions are factual in nature and were not sent for the purpose of the facilitation 
of legal services. Thus, the District Court correctly held that they were not privileged.  
D. The Two Exhibits Did Not Have a Dispositive Effect on the Arbitration Award 
“[W]hen appealing from an evidentiary ruling reviewed for abuse of discretion, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
litigation. Id. at *2. “[T]he attorneys were participating in this process because of their legal 
expertise or acumen and not because they had any particular experience in business affairs.” Id.  
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appellant must demonstrate both the trial court’s abuse of discretion and that the error affected a 
substantial right.” Hurtado v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18, 278 P.3d 415, 420 (2012). 
Even if the two documents at issue were privileged, any error was harmless.10 The entirety of the 
35 page interim award makes clear that the exhibits Safeguard challenged were not the sole basis 
for the arbitration award. T3 introduced at least 282 exhibits into evidence. R. 8111 at 2:7-9. The 
other 280 exhibits more than presented grounds upon which the award was made. Indeed, it is 
notable that Safeguard is not challenging the finding of liability whatsoever, merely the damages.  
For example, the breach of contract claim was established entirely from other exhibits. 
The evidence showed that T3 had a valid distributor agreement that gave it Account Protection 
and product pricing contractual rights. R. 8130, 32 at ¶¶ 75, 82. These contractual rights were 
shown by the T3 Distributor Agreement and a course of dealing in receiving rotated 
commissions. R. 8130 at ¶ 76. The loss in value of the distributorship, the amount of the owed 
commissions and preferential pricing damages were established through T3’s expert Robert 
Taylor. R. 8133-35 at ¶¶ 91, 96, 100. The exhibits discussed in the breach of contract section are 
exhibits 6, 10, 19-22, 263, 264, 565. R. 8129-35 at ¶¶ 73-101. None of these exhibits are at issue. 
As the breach of contract claim gives rise to all of the damages and the breach of contract claim 
did not rely on any of the challenged documents, any error is consequently harmless.  
                                                 
10 Safeguard’s cases are distinguishable in that they involved clearly privileged evidence which 
was “highly prejudicial” and dispositive. See State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 682 P.2d 571 
(1984) (attorney’s testimony regarding privileged conversation about black market or under the 
counter types of adoptions prior to purported kidnapping of two children); Frontier Refining, Inc. 
v. Gorman-Rupp Co., Inc., 136 F.3d 695, 706 (10th Cir. 1998) (there was a “significant 
probability that the evidence may have unduly influenced the jury to conclude the cause of the 
accident was Frontier’s negligence rather than the Gormon-Rupp pump.”)  
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IV. THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR VACATING THE ARBITRATION AWARD  
The Arbitration Panel found Safeguard liable for breach of contract, intentional 
interference with business relations and for violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 
each in the amount of $1,475,707.53. R. 8143 at 34:12-14. Safeguard argues that the Panel 
manifestly disregarded Texas law, violated public policy, exceeded their power and/or acted 
completely irrational. As set forth above, these largely are not proper grounds for vacating an 
arbitration award. However, even if they were, Safeguard presents no valid arguments.  
A. The Arbitration Panel Did Not Act Irrationally or Manifestly Disregard Texas Law 
in Finding a Constructive Termination  
T3’s damages for the value of the distributorship ($566,143.61) were submitted to the 
Panel for a decision and the Panel properly awarded them pursuant to Texas law.  
The scope of an arbitrator’s authority is determined in part by the demand for arbitration 
and the arbitration provision itself. Schoenduve Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 442 F.3d 727, 732 
(9th Cir. 2006). In paragraphs 128-129 of T3’s Demand, T3 specifically stated that Safeguard’s 
conduct has caused T3’s distributorship “severe damage” and “destroy[ed]” the Safeguard 
distributorship. R. 7779. Further, T3 provided a request for all “relief as may be available and as 
justice requires.” Id. T3 continued to argue for these damages before, during and after the 
arbitration.11 Consequently, T3 put the value of the distributorship and the 
impairment/termination thereto specifically at issue.  
Further, T3’s arbitration provision is broad, encompassing “all controversies, disputes or 
                                                 
11 T3’s Pre-Hearing Brief. See R. 7838; T3’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
R. 7998, 8005-06, 8019 at ¶¶ 122, 159, 212. 
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claims arising between” Safeguard and T3 related to the T3 Distributor Agreement, validity 
thereto and relationship of the parties. R. 7718 at ¶ 21(B). Where parties intend to resolve all 
aspects of their relationship or agreement by arbitration, arbitrators have the authority to decide 
any issues between the parties, even if not expressly sought by a party. See Schoenduve., 442 
F.3d at 732 (agreement requiring arbitration of any dispute arising out of or relating to 
manufacturer's representative agreement was broad enough to permit consideration of claims for 
commissions based on quasi-contract or estoppel in addition to claims based on agreement).12 
Here, the Panel’s authority to award value of the distributorship damages by way of 
constructive termination was authorized by both the demand and the arbitration clause. The 
arbitrators’ “interpretation of the scope of [their] powers is entitled to the same level of deference 
as [their] determination of the merits”. Schoenduve., 442 F.3d at 733. Thus, the Panel’s finding 
that it had authority need only be a possible interpretation of the arbitration clause and demand. 
Here, the Panel’s finding was not only a possible interpretation, it was the sole one. 
The fact that the Panel substituted T3’s impairment of value theory with a constructive 
termination theory – which covered the same item of damages – was not in error. It has long 
been recognized that arbitrators have considerable discretion in fashioning a remedy. See United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). To this end, an 
                                                 
12 See also Valentine Sugars, Inc. v. Donau Corp., 981 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting 
the argument that the arbitrator exceeded his authority when the parties submitted everything 
related to the dispute to the arbitration panel and there was no contractual provision removing the 
issue from the arbitrator's jurisdiction); Management & Tech. Consultants v. Parsons–Jurden, 
820 F.2d 1531, 1534–35 (9th Cir.1987) (“An agreement to arbitrate ‘any dispute’ without strong 
limiting or excepting language immediately following it logically includes not only the dispute, 
but the consequences naturally flowing from it...”) 
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arbitrator may apply a different theory of recovery of damages than are advanced by the 
aggrieved party and not run afoul of Section 11(b) of the FAA. See e.g. Cal-Circuit ABCO, Inc. 
v. Solbourne Computer, Inc., 848 F.Supp. 1506, 1509 (D. Colo. 1994) (holding that arbitrator did 
not exceed his authority by applying a different means of assessing damages for breach of 
contract under the UCC than that specified by the seller in its claim).  
Safeguard also argues that the Panel disregarded Texas law and instead followed 
Connecticut/New Jersey law. The only possible ground to vacate based upon improper choice of 
law is where the arbitrators are clearly applying another state’s law despite the choice of law 
clause. See e.g. Barnes v. Logan, 122 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying Section 3294 of 
the California Civil Code despite the Minnesota choice of law clause).  
Here, however, the Panel applied Texas law. The Panel specifically noted that “[e]ach of 
T3’s damages categories [including value of the distributorship] are recoverable under Texas law 
because they are actual damages for commercial loss that naturally flow and were reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of SBS’s breach.” R. 8133 at ¶ 90. The Panel only looked to out-of-
state caselaw to ascertain how a Texas court may rule on the issue of constructive termination. R. 
8116 at 7:13-17, R. 8129-30 at ¶ 73, R. 8133-35 at ¶¶ 90, 97-98. The fact that the Panel cited to 
cases outside of Texas does not mean that it did not apply Texas law in accordance with the T3 
Distributor Agreement. As the District Court recognized, “[i]it is a widely accepted practice for a 
court to look to other jurisdictions for guidance in determining how to apply the forum state’s 
law especially where, as here, the forum state has not yet addressed the application of a particular 
theory.” R. 12746.   
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The cases that the Panel cited to presented a colorable legal basis upon which a Texas 
court may find a constructive termination. R. 8135 at ¶ 98. Indeed, the cases concerned whether 
the loss of exclusivity by a franchisee resulted in a termination and/or loss of value in the 
distributorship’s contractual rights. Id. The Panel did not rely on any other states’ statutes or in 
Texas having a franchise statute, in finding that a Texas court would award damages under a 
constructive termination theory. Id.; see also Maintainco, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift 
Am., Inc., 975 A.2d 510, 520 (N.J. App. Div. 2009) (“The doctrine of constructive termination is 
also part of contract law, rather than a statutory invention”).  
Safeguard concedes it cannot point to any case showing that Texas law does not allow for 
constructive termination. That is determinative. Indeed, Texas caselaw suggests the opposite. See 
e.g. Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 855 S.W.2d 792, 793 (Tex. 
App. 1993) (upholding the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission’s finding that Kawasaki’s actions 
resulted in a “de facto” (or constructive) termination of a franchise). Here, since the Panel 
applied Texas law and Safeguard cannot point to any Texas law to the contrary, there is no basis 
for vacatur under a manifest disregard standard.  
Setting aside the constructive termination theory of recover, if there is a colorable basis 
under Texas law for the value of distributorship damages, the award is upheld.13 The Panel’s 
                                                 
13 See Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (the award “should be enforced, 
despite a court's disagreement with it on the merits, if there is a barely colorable justification for 
the outcome reached.”); Coutee, 336 F.3d at 1134–35 (“an arbitration award should be confirmed 
unless the arbitrators could not have rendered the same award without manifestly disregarding 
the governing law.”); Saleemi, 292 P.3d at 114 (“an arbitrator's incorrect choice-of-law [is] not 
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ruling as to value of the distributorship damages could also have been made based on a lost 
business value theory. “Lost business value is an appropriate measure of damages when business 
value is completely or almost completely destroyed.” Wellogix, Inc. v. Accenture, LLP, 823 F. 
Supp. 2d 555, 569 (S.D. Tex. 2011); Vianet Grp. PLC v. Tap Acquisition, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-
3601-B, 2016 WL 4368302, at *22 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2016). 
The value of T3’s distributorship was based on Account Protection. R. 8135 at ¶ 98 (“By 
giving the same ‘exclusive’ rights to DocuSource and IBF, [Safeguard] diluted the value of the 
Distributor Agreement Account Protection Rights.”) The Panel concluded that T3’s business lost 
its value due to Safeguard’s failure to enforce Account Protection and the pricing advantages 
given to IBF and DocuSource. R. 8135 at ¶ 99. (“[Safeguard’s] breach damaged T3’s business to 
such an extent that the Distributor Agreement now fails its essential purpose.”) “Under Texas 
law, ‘the proper measure of damages for destruction of a business is measured by the difference 
between the value of the business before and after the injury or destruction.’” Wellogix, Inc. v. 
Accenture, LLP, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 569; Sawyer v. Fitts, 630 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tex. App. 1982). 
The Panel computed the lost value as the difference between the value of the T3 business before 
and after Safeguard’s actions. R. 8135 at ¶ 100. Thus, the loss of business value is a colorable 
basis for the damages and another basis for upholding the award. 
B. The Arbitration Panel Did Not Act Irrationally In Simultaneously Awarding Future 
Damages and Terminating The Distributorship 
The Panel’s decision to award T3 future lost commission damages and terminate T3’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
grounds for reversal unless the arbitrator could not have made the award under the properly 
chosen law.”) 
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distributorship was neither contradictory or irrational.  
Safeguard’s caselaw stands for the proposition that if a contract is terminated a party 
cannot be required to perform according to its terms in the future. Texas law does prohibit that. 
See e.g. Henry v. Masson, 333 S.W.3d 825, 840 (Tex. App. 2010) (“when one party to a contract 
commits a material breach of that contract, the other party is discharged or excused from further 
performance.”) Safeguard’s position ignores the fact that T3 is not receiving any future benefits 
or performance under the Agreement. R. 12747. The Panel unequivocally found that the 
Agreement was not continuing, contrary to Safeguard’s arguments. R. 8151 at 17-18 (“Further 
performance by T3, its principals or its agents under the Distributor Agreement [was] excused by 
virtue of [Safeguard’s] material breach.”) Instead, T3’s future Account Protection damages 
represent the lost asset value going forward – the value of the future commission stream based on 
IBF’s sales to T3’s Protected Customers.14 R. 8134 at ¶ 94. This is not the same as Safeguard 
being required to perform in the future (e.g. rotate commissions to T3 going forward). 
Critically, Safeguard does not provide any legal authority showing that a contractual 
termination acts as an absolute prohibition on future damages. Termination and future damages 
go hand in hand.15 Future damages are proper as T3 was entitled to be put “in the same economic 
                                                 
14 Safeguard also misstates Robert Taylor’s testimony. Taylor testified that if IBF stopped selling 
to T3’s Protected Customers, there would be no future damages. R. 7900 at 1666:9-1667:1. He 
did not testify that if the contract terminated that there would be no future damages. Id.  
15 See e.g. Texas Dep't of Family & Protective Servs. v. Parra, 503 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tex. App. 
2016) (allowing for future lost earnings after termination); City of Ingleside v. Kneuper, 768 
S.W.2d 451, 459 (Tex. App. 1989), writ denied (Oct. 25, 1989) (employee wrongfully 
terminated may recover loss of future wages); Boston Pizza Restaurants, L.P. v. Bay Three Ltd., 
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position [it] would have been had the contract not been breached.” Armendariz v. Mora, 553 
S.W.2d 400, 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); see also Am. Speedy Printing Centers, Inc. v. AM Mktg., 
Inc., 69 F. App'x 692, 699 (6th Cir. 2003) (party was entitled to all damages necessary to put 
itself in a position equivalent to that in which it would have found itself if the franchise 
agreement had continued in effect for the full twenty-year term.) 
Safeguard’s argument is also frivolous for the following reasons. First, this issue is 
confined to breach of contract damages. It cannot be grounds for vacating the future damages as 
to the tortious interference and DTPA claims. Second, Safeguard sought and agreed to the 
termination in light of the future damages. R. 8150 at 1:16-18; see also R. 8151 at 1 (“The 
parties agree that Distributor Agreement is terminated.”) By failing to object and indeed 
stipulating that the Agreement was terminated, Safeguard waived the issue as a basis for appeal.  
Third, to satisfy the “completely irrational” standard, Safeguard must show that the 
Panel’s decision was not “derived from the agreement, viewed in light of the agreement’s 
language and context, as well as other indications of the parties’ intentions.” Lagstein v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 607 F.3d 364, 641 (9th Cir. 2010). The United States Supreme 
Court has instructed that an award should be upheld “as long as the arbitrator is even arguably 
construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority”. United 
Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987). Here, the Panel 
construed the Agreement in awarding future damages and finding a constructive termination. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Inc., No. 3:12-CV-00426-O, 2013 WL 12123894, at *10 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2013) (breach of 
franchise agreement made Plaintiff unable to collect future profits resulting in damages in the 
value of the future profits), 
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Indeed, the District Court found that “[t]hese elements of damages are clearly derived from the 
parties’ agreement.” R. 12747. Thus, the Panel’s finding of termination and award of future lost 
commissions is not grounds for vacatur.   
C. The Arbitration Panel Did Not Issue A Double Recovery  
Safeguard argues that the Panel granted a duplicative double recovery by awarding both 
future lost profits and the value of the distributorship. However, as explained by T3’s expert 
Robert Taylor, the future lost commission damages are based on IBF’s sales to T3’s Protected 
Customers. R. 8527 at 1562:17-21. The value of the distributorship damages are based on T3’s 
sales to T3’s Protected Customers. There is no overlap between these two categories. See R. 
8529-30 at 1590:21-1591:21. Safeguard is simply misrepresenting the damages to this Court.  
The cases Safeguard has relied upon hold that an award of future lost profits and “going 
concern” value may be duplicative. See e.g. Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 664 (5th 
Cir. 1974). However, it is only duplicative where “future profits are a principal element in going 
concern value.” Id. That is not the case here as the commissions from IBF’s sales are not taken 
into account in valuing T3’s distributorship. See R. 8541-42, 8554-8607, 8719. As there is no 
overlap in damages, there can be no irrationality or violation of public policy and thus no 
grounds for vacatur. R. 12747.   
D. The Arbitration Panel Did Not Manifestly Disregard Texas Law in Awarding 
Damages for Past Lost Commissions 
T3’s past lost commission damages of $321,657.77 represent the benefit of the bargain 
and consequential damages for T3’s claims of breach of contract, intentional interference with 
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business relations and for violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. T3’s damages 
are based on a specifically identifiable loss, Safeguard’s failure to pay T3 the commissions for 
sales made by IBF and DocuSource to T3’s Protected Customers. Thus, the damages are in 
accord with Texas law. See e.g. Sw. Recreational Indus. v. FieldTurf, No. 01-50073, 2002 WL 
32783971, *4-5 (5th Cir. 2002) (damages upheld where plaintiff showed lost sales to twenty-
nine prospective customers and what the typical profit margin was on those sales).  
If T3’s Distributor Agreement had been complied with, T3 would have received all the 
commissions on sales to its Protected Customers made by Safeguard, IBF and DocuSource sales 
agents. In arriving at the net commissions amount of $321,657.77, T3’s expert Robert Taylor 
deducted for all expenses and costs that would pertain to the calculation of commissions.16 These 
lost commissions or gross profits represent the net commissions that would have been rotated to 
T3 had Safeguard fully performed. See R. 7900 at 1668:17-19 (arbitrator noting that “[d]espite 
what [Safeguard’s counsel] is saying between commissions and gross profits, they are the same 
guy.”) T3 did not need to incur any additional fixed expenses for commissions to be rotated. R. 
8505 at p. 1160:8-14 (commissions simply rotated). Thus, T3’s damages, the lost commissions, 
were the benefit of the bargain. They are also the damages proximately caused by Safeguard.  
                                                 
16 At the hearing, Robert Taylor was specifically asked the following:  
“Q: In fact, under paragraph 6B of T3’s distributor agreement in calculating commissions 
payable, net sales of Safeguard systems means the amount actually received by Safeguard 
credited to the distributor less all taxes, all transportation and freight costs, all handling costs, all 
returns and allowances, and also a deduction for some of these source fees that you’ve looked at. 
Were you aware of that?” 
“A. Yes. But those amounts that are shown on Exhibit 2A are the amounts that – the net 
commissions that went to IBF”. R. 7900 at 1668:2-13.   
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Safeguard erroneously argues (1) that the Panel used the wrong standard of gross rather 
than net profits; and (2) that the commissions were not properly calculated. Safeguard’s 
argument is a red herring. What is legally relevant is that all applicable expenses have been 
accounted for. Texas courts and courts applying Texas law have repeatedly held that gross 
profits is the proper standard of damages where obtaining the benefit of the bargain would have 
no effect on overhead or operating expenses. See Springs Window Fashions Div., Inc. v. Blind 
Maker, Inc., 184 S.W.3d 840, 888 (Tex. App. 2006) (“gross profits are an appropriate measure of 
lost-profit damages.”).17 The Texas Supreme Court, in a 2010 ruling, specifically rejected the 
appellant’s argument regarding a purported failure to deduct overhead and other expenses. ERI 
Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 879 (Tex. 2010). The court explained 
that certain expenses do not need to be deducted where the amounts would not fluctuate. Id.  
Safeguard does not show that any applicable expenses were not accounted for in 
calculating commissions. At the hearing, Safeguard made no argument and provided no evidence 
that additional expenses or fees should be applied. Further, even if Taylor did not account for all 
expenses (he did), this is a factual issue and thus is not a proper basis to challenge an arbitration 
                                                 
17 See also DP Sols., Inc. v. Rollins, Inc., 353 F.3d 421, 429 (5th Cir. 2003) (“the gross amount 
the non-breaching party would have received if the contract had been fulfilled should normally 
be reduced by any unpaid costs the non-breaching party would have to incur to complete 
performance of the contract.”); Digital Generation, Inc. v. Boring, No. 12-15271, 2013 WL 
4483497 at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 2013) (applying Texas law the court held that there was no 
manifest disregard of the law in that there are “multiple Texas authorities recognizing that all 
expenses need not be deducted in certain instances.”); Johnson Indus. Sales, Inc. v. Strema Sales 
Corp., 224 Fed. Appx. 709 (9th Cir. 2007) (Ninth Circuit reversed lower court noting that a jury 
could find that the lost commissions equaled lost profits). 
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award. See e.g. Kenneth H. Hughes, Inc. v. Aloha Tower Dev., Corp., 654 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 
1152 (D. Haw. 2009) (discussing damages amounts, the court noted that “the burden to modify 
an arbitration award is high, and not even an erroneous finding of fact is enough.”)  
Nor would the omissions of some expenses be an error of law, let alone manifest 
disregard. See O & B Farms, Inc. v. Black, 300 S.W.3d 418, 422 (Tex. App. 2009) (“If the best 
available evidence affords a reasonable basis for the jury to calculate damages, then recovery 
cannot be denied because the exact amount of damages cannot be ascertained.”); Qaddura v. 
Indo-European Foods, Inc., 141 S.W.3d 882, 890 (Tex. App. 2004) (“When the fact of damages 
is clear, the plaintiff is required to prove his damages with only ‘reasonable certainty.’”); Phan, 
137 S.W.3d at 772 (there must only be “some showing that expenses were deducted”). 
Safeguard’s authority is distinguishable as it solely concerns damages where there was no 
evidence of specific loss and instead a party was attempting to establish damages through a 
party’s own year over year revenue numbers or where a party did not deduct for any expenses in 
arriving at damages. 
Safeguard also cannot argue that the Arbitration Panel’s holding contradicts the language 
of the Agreement. As noted by the District Court, the Agreement did not specifically set forth 
“how rotated commissions are calculated” and thus “Safeguard cannot establish that the Panel 
was ignoring the plain language of the contract in awarding unpaid past commission.” R. 12744. 
For these reasons, the Panel did not manifestly disregard the law or act irrationally in awarding 
damages for past lost commissions.  
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E. The Arbitration Panel Did Not Manifestly Disregard Texas Law in Awarding 
Damages for the Value of Future Lost Commissions 
T3 was awarded damages for future lost commissions for IBF’s sales to T3’s Protected 
Customers. The Panel set forth both the legal and factual basis for these damages: 
T3’s lost commissions for future sales made to T3’s Protected Customers are also 
recoverable. Even if these future lost commissions could be deemed consequential 
damages, they are nevertheless recoverable because they were reasonably 
contemplated by the parties. 
 
SBS uses a metric of approximately “one times annual revenue” when it acquires 
distributors and when SBS distributors acquire other distributors. This was the 
same metric used when Teply purchased part of Thurston’s business. Thus, SBS 
itself considers the present value of future commissions to be equated to 
approximately one times the annual revenue of the company. 
 
The Panel finds that T3 and Taylor’s use of a “one times annual revenue” metric 
fairly represents the present value of future commission rights. See AZZ, Inc. v. 
Morgan, 462 S.W.3d 284, 289-90 (Tex. App. 2015). The present value of the 
future commissions for IBF’s sales to T3’s Protected Customers is $373,473.76. 
This amount is based on the last full year of IBF’s sales to T3’s Protected 
Customers. The Panel concludes that T3 is entitled to $373,473.76 in lost future 
commissions... 
 
R. 8133-34 at ¶¶ 92-94.  
Safeguard argues that the Panel’s use of the market value theory of damages was in 
manifest disregard of the law in that it doesn’t account for all expenses. First, Safeguard’s 
contention that the valuation metric does not account for expenses is factually wrong. T3’s 
expert, Robert Taylor testified that a valuation metric accounts for not only projected revenue but 
also projected expenses. R. 8531-33 at pp. 1662:8-1664:23. A valuation metric is simply a way 
of valuing the future net profits through a present value calculation.  
Second, valuation metrics are commonly used and are an accepted legal standard for 
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valuing future damages. The Fifth Circuit in Fluorine on Call Ltd. v. Fluorogas Ltd., 380 F.3d 
849, 860 (5th Cir. 2004), went into significant detail in describing these damages: 
The lost value measure of damages is the “market value of the asset at the time of 
breach—not the lost profits that the asset could have produced in the future.” This 
amount is connected to “a buyer's projections of what income he could derive 
from the asset in the future.” In describing the measure, the Second Circuit quoted 
Dobbs Law of Remedies: “Market value damages are ‘based on future profits as 
estimated by potential buyers who form the “market” and “reflect the buyer's 
discount for the fact that the profits would be postponed and ... uncertain.”’” 
 
Id. at 860 (citations omitted); see also Schonfeld v. Hillard, 218 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2000). As 
noted by the Fifth Circuit, these “market value” damages are not only sufficient but are “the best 
evidence” of future loss. Fluorine on Call, 380 F.3d at 860. In Texas, a plaintiff need only show 
that “[a]t a minimum, opinions or estimates of lost profits must be based on objective facts, 
figures, or data from which the amount of lost profits may be ascertained.” AZZ Inc., 462 S.W.3d 
at 290.18 Safeguard’s own valuation metric more than meets this requirement. 
Safeguard’s second argument is that future damages are not obtainable since T3’s 
distributorship could be terminated at any time. However, this argument is completely irrelevant 
to future damages for the tortious interference and DTPA claims. See e.g. Exxon Corp. v. Allsup, 
808 S.W.2d 648, 660 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1991) (tortious interference claim); Henry S. 
Miller Co. v. Bynum, 836 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1992) (DTPA claim). Thus, the argument is not 
grounds for vacating these damages.  
The argument also is not viable as to the breach of contract action. Safeguard never 
                                                 
18 See also Vogler v. Blackmore, 352 F.3d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 2003); Wellogix, Inc., 823 
F.Supp.2d at 569-570. 
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argued to the Panel that the Agreement was terminable at-will or month-to-month. See e.g. R. 
8098-8104. As such, there cannot be a manifest disregard of the law. See Mich. Mut. Ins., 44 
F.3d at 832 (“[i]t must be clear from the record that the arbitrator recognized the applicable law 
and then ignored it."); Bosack, 586 F.3d at 1104 (“[T]o demonstrate manifest disregard, the 
moving party must show that the arbitrator ‘underst[oo]d and correctly state[d] the law, but 
proceed[ed] to disregard the same.’”) To that point, the Panel does not even mention the issue. 
Even if the issue had been considered, there was no error of law. Safeguard argues that 
there is a manifest disregard of the law because it was undisputed that T3’s Distributor 
Agreement was terminable at will. However, the Agreement defines the parameters for 
termination within section 10(B) and 10(E). R. 7708-7711. These sections would have stayed 
operative regardless of whether the Agreement was ongoing, renewing under 5 year terms or 
month-to-month. Under section 10(B) and 10(E), Safeguard would need specific cause defined 
therein, which it did not have, to terminate the Agreement. Id. Whereas, like here, “a contract 
limits duration by the happening of any one of several ascertainable contingencies it is not 
terminable at will.” Rolling Lands Invests., L.C. v. Nw. Airport Mgmt., L.P., 111 S.W.3d 187, 
197 (Tex. App. 2003).19 Further, the Agreement cannot be terminable at will under Texas law 
because it’s a franchise agreement. See Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. Clear Lake Utilities Co., 
549 S.W.2d 385, 391 (Tex. 1977); Fluorine on Call, 380 F.3d at 857. Thus, there was no error of 
law, let alone manifest disregard. 
                                                 
19 See also City of Big Spring v. Board of Control, 404 S.W.2d 810, 815 (Tex. 1966); Brittian v. 
Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw., 533 S.W.2d 886, 891 (Tex. App. 1976). 
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Safeguard cites to paragraph 10(F) of the T3 Distributor Agreement for its position that 
the contract could be terminated at any time. R. 7771 at § 10(F). However, that section states, 
instead, that the contract continues to be in force as long as T3 is in compliance with all terms 
and conditions. Id. It does state that if T3 failed to timely sign the then-current agreement, the 
Agreement would continue on a month-to-month basis. Id. However, there was no evidence that 
T3 was ever offered a then-current agreement and refused to sign it. Instead, the only evidence 
was that Safeguard did not offer a then-current agreement once the first 5 years passed.20 
Whether the agreement was month to month was consequently a disputed fact. See R. 8512. 
Further, even if the T3 Distributor Agreement was terminable at will, T3 had a right to 
future damages. Under section 12(B) of the Agreement, T3 was entitled to 50% of commissions 
going forward 4 years after termination. R. 7714. Thus, even if the Agreement was at will (it was 
not), T3 had a colorable basis for future commissions. As there was always some future damages 
that could be awarded to T3 and the amount thereof is a factual dispute, Safeguard’s argument is 
not grounds for vacating the future damages.   
There is also no viable argument that the Panel acted outside the scope of the T3 
Distributor Agreement in awarding future damages for breach of contract. As the Supreme Court 
stated in Oxford Health Plans, 569 U.S. at 569, the “sole question” for the court on motions to 
vacate under § 10(a)(4) is “whether the arbitrator (even arguably) interpreted the parties’ 
contract, not whether he got its meaning right or wrong.” Safeguard presents no argument that 
                                                 
20 “Q: It’s your position that there was no renewal five-year period after the first five years ended; 
is that right?” “A: According to what Kevin Skipper told me, that’s correct. I didn’t have to 
renew – write a new agreement, I should say. It was ongoing.” R. 7877-78 at 1261:18-1262:2.  
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the Panel was not interpreting the Agreement when awarding future damages.  
F. The Arbitration Panel Did Not Manifestly Disregard Texas Law in Awarding 
Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses  
The Panel’s award of $2,449,208.14 in attorneys’ fees and $437.126.28 in costs conforms 
to both Texas law and the T3 Distributor Agreement. The Panel found that T3 had a right under 
Texas law to attorneys’ fees and expenses. R. 8258 at p. 2:19-20. T3 had a right to its attorneys’ 
fees under Texas law for both its breach of contract and DTPA claims. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 
REM. CODE § 38.001 (for breach of contract); TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE § 17.50 (DTPA).  
Safeguard argues attorneys’ fees are barred by T3’s purported failure to present the claim 
to Safeguard prior to the lawsuit. That is wrong both factually and legally. First, T3 has a right to 
attorneys’ fees under the DTPA claim which the presentment requirement does not apply to. See 
Melson v. Stemma Expl. & Prod. Co., 801 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Tex. App. 1990) (noting 
presentment requirement applies to Section 38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies 
Code). Safeguard does not specifically address the attorneys’ fees issue under the DTPA. 
Second, as to the breach of contract claim, T3 provided evidence of presentment, e.g. that it 
demanded payment. 21 Thus, there was a factual dispute as to presentment. It cannot be grounds 
for a manifest disregard of the law.22 
                                                 
21 For an entire year prior to filing the lawsuit, Dawn Teply repeatedly requested to Safeguard’s 
general counsel Michael Dunlap that Safeguard enforce Account Protection and pay the owed 
commissions. See R. 8472-79, 8481, 8486-88, 8494-8504, 8506-11, 8515-22.   
22 “The term ‘presentment’ means ‘simply a demand or request for payment or performance[.]’” 
Note Inv. Grp., Inc. v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 476 S.W.3d 463, 485 (Tex. App. 2015). A 
simple verbal assertion of a claim or request for payment suffices. See Karol v. Presidio Enters., 
Inc., 622 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Tex. App. 1981). 
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Safeguard also argues that the Panel disregarded Texas law in awarding attorneys’ fees 
for unsegregated services performed on both T3 and Thurston’s behalf. However, the Texas 
Supreme Court has made it clear that a party can recover for work done on behalf of multiple 
parties, what is called “unsegregated fees.”  See Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 
299 (2006). In Chapa, the Texas Supreme Court held that “when discrete legal services advance 
both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be 
segregated.” Id. at 314. Safeguard cites to no caselaw23 for the proposition that this rule set forth 
by the Texas Supreme Court would not apply where there are multiple proceedings. Instead, 
other Texas courts have followed Chapa and applied it in situations where work was conducted 
on behalf of multiple parties. See E.J. Du Pont Dc Nernours & Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 259 S.W.3d 
800, 807-809 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist. 2007, pet. denied)). There is not an error of law, let 
alone manifest disregard in awarding unsegregated fees.  
Nor is the Panel’s decision to multiple the attorneys’ fees by 2 in manifest disregard of 
Texas law. The Panel found that 2x multiplier was “appropriate in this matter given the Mulcahy 
Firm’s contingency arrangement, the nature of the case and the difficulties is presented.” R. 
8263. This is entirely consistent with Texas law. “Texas courts consistently allow the use of a 
multiplier based upon the contingent nature of a fee under Texas statutes allowing recovery of 
                                                 
23 Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997) is distinguishable. 
It stands for the proposition that a factfinder must evaluate the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees 
under the multiple factor test before simply awarding the contingent fee amount. Id. at 818-819. 
The statement that attorneys’ fees must be decided in “light of the worked performed in the very 
case for which the fee is sought” relates to considering whether the fees are reasonable and 
necessary based on the worked performed to advance the winning party’s case. Id. It is not a 
comment on multiple proceedings effecting an attorneys’ fees award.  
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attorney’s fees.” Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Gonzales, 72 S.W.3d 398, 413 (Tex. App. 2002) 
(upholding a multiplier of 2 based on the novelty and difficulty of the issues, the contingent fee, 
the time limitations imposed by the circumstances, and the preclusion of other employment).24 
Texas courts uphold the application of an attorneys’ fees multiplier where the multiplier 
results in the fees being significantly higher than the contingent fee amount25 or actual damages.26 
Regardless, the amount of the multiplier and fees as compared to the damages is a factual 
question and not an error of law. The only apparent rule in Texas is that a multiplier should 
generally not be more than 4 times the lodestar, which it was not here. See El Apple I, Ltd. v. 
Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 764 (Tex. 2012).  
The Panel did not err as to costs either. The Panel embarked on an interpretation of the 
Agreement and its interpretation cannot be grounds for vacatur. See R. 8258 (“The arbitration 
clause in the Distributor Agreement authorizes the Panel to award attorneys’ fees and expenses 
                                                 
24 See also Stratton v. STO Energy Inc., No. 02–10–004830CV, 2012 WL 407385 (Tex. App. 
Feb. 9, 2012) (2.17 multiplier of a lodestar of $3,968,277.25 was appropriate because, among 
other things, “the high risk borne by its contingent nature” and the “undesirability of the 
litigation”); Edwards v. Aaron Rents, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 2d 803, 813 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (granting 
“an upward adjustment” in fees as “Plaintiff's counsel should be compensated for the risk he took 
in advocating this case on a contingent basis and for the delay in his compensation”).  
25 See e.g. Haggar Apparel Co. v. Leal, 100 S.W.3d 303, 308 (Tex. App. 2002), reversed on other 
grounds, 154 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. 2004) (although the defendant objected that the multiplier slightly 
below 2 resulted in attorneys’ fees exceeded the amount recovered by 300% (and contingent 
amount by 500-700%), the fees were affirmed); see also Dillard Dept. Stores, 72 S.W.3d at 412-
413; E.F. Johnson Co. v. Infinity Glob. Tech., No. 05-14-01209-CV, 2016 WL 4254496, at *12 
(Tex. App. Aug. 11, 2016). 
26 See e.g. Northwinds Abatement, Inc. v. Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau, 258 F.3d 345, 355 (5th Cir. 
2001) (affirming $712,000 in attorneys' fees on recovery of $74,570 in actual damages); Bencon 
Mgmt. & Gen. Contracting, Inc. v. Boyer, Inc., 178 S.W.3d 198, 209 (Tex. App. 2005); see 
Gorman v. Countrywood Property Owners Assoc., 1 S.W.3d 915, 920-921 (Tex. App.— 1999). 
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in this matter. Section 21(B) of the Distributor Agreement provides that…”) It was certainly a 
possible interpretation for the Panel to find that Section 21(B) 27, either alone, or in conjunction 
with AAA Rule 47(a) gave the Panel authority to award additional costs beyond those available 
under Texas statutory law. See Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 462; R. 12748-49 (District Court’s finding).  
As both parties submitted a request for costs (R. 7787, 7810), the issue was properly 
before the Panel. See e.g. Thomas v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 921 S.W.2d 847, 851 (Tex. App. 
1996) (affirming AAA Panel’s award of fees and costs as allowed based on separate contractual 
provision); Saqer v. Ghanem, No. 09-07-519 CV, 2008 WL 5263359, at *5-6 (Tex. App. Dec. 
18, 2008) (broad language of arbitration agreement and parties demands allowed for attorneys’ 
fees). In addition to Section 21(B), the incorporation of the AAA rules also gave the Panel 
authority to award costs. See Black v. Shor, 443 S.W.3d 154, 169-170 (Tex. App. 2013); 
Kvaerner Oilfield Prod., Inc. v. Cooper Cameron Corp., No. CIV.A. H-05-0992, 2007 WL 
1850014, at *7 (S.D. Tex. June 26, 2007) (AAA rules provided authority for arbitrators to award 
attorneys’ fees and costs). Thus, the Panel did not exceed its authority or act irrationally.  
The Panel’s decision to find that Section 21(B) expanded and/or gave independent 
grounds for expenses was not in manifest disregard of the law. As the Panel stated, the statutory 
costs allowed under Texas Civil Practice and Remedy Code, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 
§§22.001(c) & 31.007(b), “are only a limited subset of the larger category of “expenses” 
authorized under AAA Rule 47(c).” R. 8258-59. “[P]arties are free to contract for a fee-recovery 
                                                 
27 “THE ARBITRATORS SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO AWARD OR INCLUDE IN THEIR 
AWARD ANY RELIEF WHICH THEY DEEM PROPER IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES […]” 
R. 7719.  
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standard either looser or stricter than [Texas Statutes]”. Peterson Grp., Inc. v. PLTQ Lotus Grp., 
L.P., 417 S.W.3d 46, 60 (Tex. App. 2013). “When parties include such a provision in a contract, 
the language of the contract controls, rather than the language of the statute.” Id.  
For these reasons, Safeguard has not shown that the Panel acted irrationally or manifestly 
disregarded Texas law in its award of attorneys’ fees and expenses.  
V. T3 IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS FOR THE APPEAL  
Under Texas law, “once a right to attorney's fees is established, the award may include 
attorney's fees for any appeal.” Cap Rock Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Texas Utilities Elec. Co., 874 
S.W.2d 92, 102 (Tex. App. 1994). T3 had a right to its attorneys’ fees under Texas substantive 
law for both its breach of contract and DTPA claims. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 
38.001 (for breach of contract); TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE § 17.50 (DTPA). Both statutes 
authorize T3 to be awarded attorneys’ fees for appeal.28 For these reasons, T3 may be awarded 
attorneys’ fees under substantive Texas law upon a remand back to the Arbitration Panel. 
This Court may also award T3 its attorneys’ fees as Safeguard’s appeal was frivolous. 
Idaho Code Section 12-121 allows an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party where "the 
action was pursued, defended, or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." 
Idaho Military Historical Soc'y v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 633, 329 P.3d 1072, 1081 (2014). 
Section 12-121 is discretionary and therefore is considered to be procedural requiring application 
                                                 
28 See Cap Rock, 874 S.W.2d at 102 (“find[ing] the award of appellate attorney’s fees to be 
proper” for section 38.001); Cont'l Dredging, Inc. v. De-Kaizered, Inc., 120 S.W.3d 380, 397 
(Tex. App. 2003) (attorneys’ fees proper for appeal of DTPA claim). 
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of Idaho’s law.29 See Carroll v. MBNA Am. Bank, 148 Idaho 261, 270, 220 P.3d 1080, 1089 
(2009); see also Houston v. Whittier, 147 Idaho 900, 911, 216 P.3d 1272, 1283 (2009).  
Here, Safeguard had no reasonable basis for bringing an appeal. Attorneys’ fees should 
be awarded under Section 12-121 in that Safeguard has failed to show that either that the District 
Court or the Panel incorrectly applied the law in any way. See Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 
487, 65 P.3d 502, 509 (2003); Wagner v. Wagner, 160 Idaho 294, 302, 371 P.3d 807, 815 
(2016). Instead, Safeguard largely asks this Court to second-guess the District Court and Panel 
without regard to whether its arguments even present proper grounds for appeal under the FAA. 
Chicoine v. Bignall, 127 Idaho 225, 899 P.2d 438 (1995) is instructive. After rejecting the 
arguments for vacatur, the court noted “when the parties bargain for the binding decision of an 
arbitrator, they necessarily accept the fact that his interpretation of the facts, the law, and the 
equities of the situation may not be entirely satisfactory.” Id. at 228. “The mere fact that an 
arbitrator's interpretation of a prior case is unsatisfactory to a party is not, of itself, a valid basis 
for appeal.” Id. This Court similarly held in Mumford v. Miller, 143 Idaho 99, 101, 137 P.3d 
1021, 1023 (2006), that where an appeal does not present proper grounds for vacating an 
arbitration award, attorneys’ fees should be awarded under I.C. § 12-121. Id. at 101.  
There is a strong public policy in Idaho “encouraging early payment of valid arbitration 
awards and the discouragement of nomeritorious protracted confirmation challenges.” Driver v. 
SI Corp., 139 Idaho 423, 80 P.3d 1024, 1031 (2003). Safeguard’s frivolous motion and appeal 
                                                 
29 Even if Texas law was applicable, Tex. R. App. P. 45 similarly authorizes an appellate court to 
award a prevailing party “just damages” where an appeal is frivolous. See e.g. Njuku v. 
Middleton, 20 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tex. App. 2000). 


